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MENA in Turbulence

Russia Balances Relationship with Iran and Other Gulf States

Russia calls for restraint from ally Iran while also performing naval drill  with it | The Times of Israel

Executive Summary:

  • Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg on April 27 about the ongoing conflict in and around Iran. The visit highlighted the two states’ Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, signed in January 2025.
  • Russia has reaped some economic benefits from Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which raised oil demand and prices and caused the United States to ease sanctions on Russian oil already at sea. If Moscow shows robust military support for Iran, however, it risks damaging economic and diplomatic ties with other Gulf states.
  • Russia is constrained from acting as a main mediator in the Iran conflict due to its war against Ukraine. The Iran conflict also endangers key trade corridors, including the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which links Russia and Iran via the Caucasus.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg on April 27 to discuss the ongoing conflict in and around Iran (The Moscow TimesInterfax, April 27). Araghchi’s visit to Moscow highlighted the two states’ Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty—which Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed in January 2025—and raised questions about how Moscow benefits from the ongoing conflict between the United States and Iran (President of Russia, April 21, 2025). During the meeting, Putin praised the Iranian people for “fighting for their independence and sovereignty” (President of Russia, April 27). Moscow aims to secure benefits from the Hormuz Strait crisis to gain additional leverage in negotiations on its war against Ukraine.

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Azerbaijani Politics Russia in Caucasus South Caucasus Region

Russia Scents Iran War Opportunity in South Caucasus

Photo: Russian army soldiers in winter camouflage go through training exercises at an altitude of 3,500 meters on the slopes of Mount Elbrus in Russia's Caucasus January 18, 2013. Credit: REUTERS/Kazbek Basayev.

On April 15, the Foreign Ministries of Azerbaijan and Russia issued a joint statement on the shooting down of Azerbaijani Airlines flight 8243 by Russian air defense systems in December 2024, killing 38 people. The tragedy, compounded by Moscow’s denial of responsibility, had triggered a sharp deterioration in Azerbaijani-Russian relations. Baku escalated its rhetoric against Moscow, suspended bilateral cooperation across multiple sectors, and worked toward rapprochement with the European Union and the US.

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Azerbaijani Politics Iran in Caucasus and Beyond South Caucasus Region

Türkiye and Azerbaijan Contend With Potential Kurdish Role in Iran Conflict

Azerbaijan hosts joint drills with Turkey near Armenia - International -  World - Ahram Online

Executive Summary:

  • Ankara has signaled from the outset of the Iran conflict that it would consider military intervention in northern Iraq’s Kurdistan region should a Kurdish-led insurgency materialize.
  • Türkiye views potential Kurdish militancy in Iran as a direct national security threat, strongly opposes any armed Kurdish role, and has signaled it could consider intervention to prevent Kurdish cross-border insurgency and regional destabilization.
  • Azerbaijan fears Kurdish involvement in the Iran conflict could destabilize Iran’s northwest, inflaming ethnic tensions and endangering Azerbaijani minorities in the region along with regional connectivity drives. Ankara and Baku coordinate diplomatically and militarily to contain spillover risks.

Washington and Tel Aviv reportedly considered providing political and logistical support for Iranian Kurdish militant groups along the Iran–Iraq border in the first week or two of their conflict with Iran (Future War Magazine, March 26; The Times of Israel, March 29). The plan was abandoned in late March because of regional diplomatic pressure, Tehran’s military strikes on Kurdish regions of Iran and Iraq, Iran’s intelligence crackdown, inconsistent support from the United States and Israel, and media leaks. The potential involvement of Kurdish militias in the Iran conflict could draw more regional states into the conflict, particularly Türkiye, which has expressed clear opposition to any armed Kurdish role in Iran (Amwaj, March 25).

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Azerbaijani Politics Iran in Caucasus and Beyond South Caucasus Region

Will the Caspian Region Be Drawn Into the Iran War?

Photo: Navy ships of Iran and Azerbaijan move during an exercise between Iran and Azerbaijan in the Caspian Sea, Iran, in this picture obtained on November 4, 2024. Credit: Iranian Army/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via REUTERS

Of the more than 12,000 Iranian sites targeted by the US and Israel, the strikes against an obscure Caspian Sea naval base seemed at first sight one of the oddest.

Israel said it hit dozens of targets, including warships, a command post, a shipyard, and port infrastructure at Bandar Anzali on March 18.

The operation marked the first-ever missile attack in the Caspian Sea. While the port is not the primary base of the Caspian Flotilla, also known as the Northern Fleet, it was likely a dispersal base for military units.

The aim? To strike at the Iranian-Russian military trade across the Caspian Sea, the Wall Street Journal reported. The route’s importance has been growing since Russia launched its all-out war on Ukraine four years ago, and now involves the shipment of key military items, including drones based on the Shahed design.

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Azerbaijani Politics MENA in Turbulence South Caucasus Region

The Caucasus Front: Azerbaijan and Iran in the Expanding Gulf War

On March 5, 2026, two drones launched by Iran struck Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave, damaging Nakhchivan International Airport and a nearby school building while injuring several bystanders. The South Caucasus, particularly Azerbaijan and Iran’s border regions, have recently experienced unprecedented escalation following the U.S.-Israeli military operation against Iran, dubbed “Operation Epic Fury.” Although Azerbaijan has remained neutral since the war’s onset, Baku has voiced growing concerns about the conflict’s potential repercussions for the wider region.

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Azerbaijani Politics Iran in Caucasus and Beyond MENA in Turbulence South Caucasus Region

Azerbaijan Seeks to Balance Ties with Israel, Turkey & Iran

Ilham Aliyev participated in panel session on “Defining Eurasia's Economic  Identity” in Davos » Official web-site of President of Azerbaijan Republic
Azerbaijan is watching rising unrest in neighboring Iran and the prospect of new Israeli or American strikes on that country with concern

A late January visit by Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar to Baku, where he met with President Ilham Aliyev and Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov, was framed by Azerbaijani state media as a significant event reflecting Azerbaijan’s growing authority within regional and global security frameworks.

Israel and Azerbaijan have a long-standing strategic partnership, and the inclusion of a large business delegation underscored Israel’s intent to expand economic cooperation with Azerbaijan, likely through joint projects in energy and infrastructure, especially in the formerly war-torn Karabakh region.

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South Caucasus Region

Romania Makes Itself Indispensable to NATO

Photo: A view of a Romanian MLI-84 infantry fighting vehicle and its crew through foreground of tree branches during Dacian Fall 25. NATO forces in Romania demonstrated their ability to expand from a multinational battlegroup to an armoured brigade, quickly absorbing thousands of French Army troops as part of exercise Dacian Fall 25. The drills included troops from Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, North Macedonia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and the United States. It ran from 20 October to 13 November 2025. Credit: NATO via Flickr https://flic.kr/p/2rKW1vB

The new center, which has been operational since January, will operate alongside a similar facility in Rzeszów, Poland, as NATO’s military infrastructure in countries surrounding Ukraine continues to grow.

At the same time, a newly expanded military base at Mihail Kogălniceanu, Romania, will increase the alliance’s presence in the Black Sea, which \has traditionally been dominated by Russia. It will be able to host 10,000 soldiers by 2030, reaffirming Bucharest’s strategic orientation as a committed NATO member.

The expansion of Romania’s defense capabilities comes in the wake of Washington’s new approach to European security, which includes demands that European nations should shoulder a greater share of their own defense, both financially and operationally. In October, the US said it would withdraw around 700 military personnel from Romania, but another 1,000 remain.

Categories
Azerbaijani Politics MENA in Turbulence South Caucasus Region

Azerbaijan hedges as crisis worsens in neighbouring Iran

Azerbaijan-Iran relations: from the past to the future | Ereforms.gov.az

As Iran faces violent anti-governmental protests across major cities, officials across the border in Azerbaijan have refrained from commenting. Yet the unrest raises questions over whether Baku’s long-standing policy of non-interference would survive a potential collapse of the Islamic Republic.

Like Iran’s other near neighbours Armenia, Russia and Turkey, Azerbaijan has adopted a cautious stance, avoiding condemning Tehran’s violent suppression of dissent. This contrasts with the Western countries, whose diplomatic statements are filled with an anti-Iranian regime narrative, providing support to protesters.

Categories
South Caucasus Region

Exporting Power: Türkiye’s Defense Industry and the Politics of Strategic Autonomy

Turkey has increased exports of its defense industry products to Uzbekistan  five times | BLACKSEA CASPIA

Over the last decade, the development of Turkey’s defense industry has become a crucial aspect of its soft power diplomacy in both regional and global politics. The country has made significant efforts to invest heavily in developing its indigenous defense industry, reducing its dependence on imports and becoming a leading defense exporter in global markets.[1] The rapidly changing regional and global geopolitical landscape, particularly after the Arab uprisings, has prompted Ankara to expand the country’s defense industry and reduce its reliance on overseas arms procurement and international supply chains.

Since the ruling AKP government came to power, the country’s indigenous defense industry has undergone a significant transformation, steadily becoming the twelfth-largest arms exporter, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).[2] Given the regional instability marked by violent uprisings and sectarian conflicts, Türkiye’s pursuit of defense industry development can be understood as a primarily threat-driven strategy. This approach reflects an effort to enhance national defense capabilities and ensure strategic autonomy in response to both external security challenges and internal vulnerabilities. The close alignment with the West during the Cold War era helped Türkiye secure itself and gain access to the U.S. and NATO military-industrial complex and advanced weapons systems, which played a major role in transforming the local defense industry.

Categories
MENA in Turbulence

The new chapter “Proxy Warfare Recalibrated: Iran’s Decentralized Proxy Strategy in the New Regional Order” is now available

A new edited volume by the well-known Turkish academic Gokhan Chinkara has been published. The volume comprises several chapters by leading scholars, focusing on the security and power vacuum in the Middle East, the US role in reshaping the region, and the impact of the ongoing Israel-Gaza conflict.

My chapter focuses on Iran’s recalibrating proxy warfare strategy in the aftermath of the Gaza War and Tehran’s desperate efforts to use proxy groups against Israel and Western allies. However, such efforts fell short during the recent 12-Day war, highlighting Iran’s strategic failures. The chapter also dives into specific angles of Iran’s proxy warfare strategy and attempts to restore proxy networks in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria despite Israel’s expanding war across the region.