Category Archives: Middle East and North Africa Region

Is the Balkan region Israel’s newfound interest?

Israeli President Isaac Herzog (left) with his Serbian counterpart Aleksander Vucic during his first visit to Belgrade. / Predsedništvo Srbije / Dimitrije Goll

Israeli President Isaac Herzog (left) with his Serbian counterpart Aleksander Vucic during his first visit to Belgrade. / Predsedništvo Srbije / Dimitrije Goll

Israeli President Isaac Herzog concluded his historic first visit to Albania in September, shortly after his first-ever trip to Serbia, where both sides agreed to deepen bilateral cooperation amid Israel’s extending military campaign against Hamas and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Although the recent intensive diplomatic dialogue between Israel and Balkan states is gaining more impetus, it is not a new phenomenon. In the last five years, much has been done to ensure Israel’s expanding diplomatic, security, and economic ties with the Balkans, particularly with Albania and Serbia.

In light of the worsening geopolitical tensions in the Middle East after the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023 and Israel’s large-scale military campaign in Gaza and southern Lebanon, Tel Aviv sought to build new alliances and partnerships at a critical time. Hence, Israel’s kinship in building security ties with Serbia is essential, given its well-established defense industry in the Balkan region. Continue reading

Can Turkey Undercut Israel’s Alliance with Azerbaijan Over the Gaza War?

Azerbaijan has built strong partnerships with Israel in energy and defense for the last two decades despite also maintaining ties with Turkey and Iran

The impact of the geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East stemming from the ongoing Israel–Hamas war extends far beyond the region.

Since Hamas’s brutal October 7 terror attack on southern Israel, Israeli forces have conducted large-scale military operations in Gaza to try to destroy Hamas and armed radicals affiliated with the militant Palestinian group. Although many countries in Europe and Asia voiced support for Israel at least initially, others have tried to remain neutral, while countries such as Iran, Russia, Turkey, Ireland, and Spain have blamed Israel for the excessive use of force in Gaza and disregard of civilian lives. Continue reading

Türkiye Demonstrates Increased Interest in BRICS Membership

Turkey wants to join BRICS - ảnh 1

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 100

Executive Summary:

  •  In June, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss, among other issues, Türkiye’s prospective membership in the loose-economic grouping of BRICS, which Putin “fully supports.”
  • The impetus for BRICS expansion has grown significantly amid Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with Moscow and Beijing promoting it as a critical counterweight to US and Western influence.
  • Türkiye’s pursuit of BRICS membership looks to promote foreign investment, increased market access, and economic growth and reflects a foreign policy tradition of balancing between regional powers.

On June 11, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan attended a session of the BRICS group (a loose political-economic grouping originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in Moscow. While there, he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu (Turkish Foreign Ministry, June 11). During the face-to-face meeting with Putin, Fidan discussed bilateral economic and political relations, focusing on the geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East caused by the war in Gaza (Al-Monitor, June 16). Putin vowed to “fully support” Turkish membership in BRICS and build stronger ties to facilitate further economic cooperation. Continue reading

On June 18, Saudi Arabia’s Defense Minister, Prince Khalid bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, paid an official visit to China to meet his Chinese counterpart, Admiral Dong Jun, and discuss ways to boost the military partnership between the two states. The Saudi defense minister’s first visit to Beijing should come as a little surprise as China’s arms exports to Riyadh have increased significantly in recent years.

Although the United States has traditionally occupied the role of Saudi Arabia’s main security partner and predominant arms supplier, between 2016 and 2020, China increased its arms transfers to Saudi Arabia by nearly 400 percent compared to the previous five-year period. In 2017, Saudi Arabia acquired several Chinese Wing Loong II drones and entered into a memorandum of understanding with China to manufacture an additional 300 drones domestically. The export of Chinese-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has become a political football between Riyadh and Washington, which refused to sell indigenously manufactured UAVs to the Gulf states—prompting a frustrated Saudi Arabia to look eastward. Continue reading

Risky Business: Saudi Arabia’s Oil Price Hike and Market Reaction

As the world’s leading energy exporter, Saudi Arabia’s decision to raise the price of oil for its Asian customers, namely China and India, is a significant development. The surprise move, announced ahead of the much-anticipated OPEC+ meeting on June 2, saw Saudi Aramco increase the price of Arab Light crude for Asia customers by over 300 percent—from $0.90 to $2.90 per barrel above the Oman-Dubai benchmark. Saudi officials cited strengthening oil benchmarks, particularly the price of Dubai-Oman crude, to justify the price hike. However, a more likely underlying motive would be Saudi Arabia’s desire to maintain high oil prices in the face of the ongoing war on Gaza and the potential for further destabilization across the Middle East, which pose a serious threat to global oil markets and the country’s economy—although the attempt to secure its own economic well-being will certainly buy it no friends to the east. Continue reading

Is ISIS Reviving in Iraq?

Members of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) cheer as they carry upside-down a black flag of the Islamic State (ISIS) group in the Old City of Mosul on July 2, 2017.

On May 13, Iraqi media reported a brutal attack by the notorious Islamic State (ISIS) on a military outpost in eastern Diyala and Salahuddin provinces.

Iraqi authorities did not provide specific details of the deadly incident apart from saying that the attackers killed a commanding officer and four Iraqi soldiers and wounded others. Iraqi forces launched an operation in the al-Aith area of Salahuddin in retaliation.

That the May 13 attack was  perpetrated by Islamic State militants suggests that rural areas remain a hotbed of activity for militant cells despite an earlier declaration of victory over ISIS in Iraq and Syria by a U.S.-led international anti-terrorist coalition in 2017. Other regional threats, including sectarian and proxy wars, appear to have undermined the Iraqi government’s counter-ISIS efforts and facilitated the radical organization’s revival. Continue reading

China’s Yemen Diplomacy and a Multipolar Gulf

Since it first emerged as an economic powerhouse in the 1990s and early 2000s, China has consistently adhered to the principle of neutrality and non-interference in other nations’ internal affairs. As it gained economic clout and a growing market share throughout the Middle East, Beijing preserved its reputation as a neutral market, conducting trade with all nations and remaining aloof from regional politics. Given this background, the announcement in March of a China-mediated diplomatic normalization between Saudi Arabia and Iran—the Gulf’s two primary geopolitical foes—after years of the rivalry came as a shock both to Middle Eastern and Western experts. The Saudi-Iran détente could contribute to the de-escalation of deadly tensions, particularly in the Gulf region. Riyadh and Tehran are engaged in prolonged and bloody proxy wars in the Middle East—most notably in Yemen, where Saudi Arabia has led a military coalition against the country’s northern Houthi rebels for eight years without success. Continue reading

The History and Evolution of Iran’s National Drone Program

A military unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV or drone) on a runway during a two-day drone exercise at an undisclosed location in Iran, August 24, 2022.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, launched in early 2022, has fundamentally changed the international security architecture that had existed for many years, but it has also caused global political and economic cataclysms. Although Russian forces made significant gains thanks to heavy artillery fire, including missile strikes on cities all over Ukraine in the first weeks of combat, Ukrainian defenders quickly rebuffed attempts by consolidating its military power, exercising diplomatic connections, and launching counterattacks at Russian positions.

The failures of continuous artillery and missile strikes in the following months prompted Russia to make some changes in its military tactics. As a result, Russia was forced to seek help from its traditional allies, China and Iran, through unofficial channels.[1] Although China has refrained from overtly providing military support to Russia in order not to further complicate relations with Western countries, particularly with the United States, Iran began supplying locally produced long-range attack (suicide) drones to Russia. The effective use of Iranian-made Shahed and Mohajer drones by the Russian army to conduct attacks against Ukraine’s critical civilian infrastructure in the first days has revived interest in the Iranian drone industry internationally and has brought to light the real threat of Iran’s long-standing national drone program to security across the Middle East region.[2]  Continue reading

Ethnic Minorities in the Iranian Protests: Tehran’s No-Win Situation

The ongoing mass protests in Iran, which have steadily grown more violent over the past two months, risk escalating regional tensions with neighboring states. Although all major Iranian cities have experienced clashes between demonstrators and security forces, the level of violence demonstrated by the Iranian security forces in BaluchestanKhuzestan, and Kurdistan provinces appeared to be more significant than in other cities without large ethnic minority groups. The Iranian regime’s harsh stance toward Baluchis, Kurds, Arabs, and Azerbaijanis comes as part of a broader conflict between the Iranian government and ethnic minorities seeking better treatment or greater autonomy; Tehran has attempted to subdue its restive Kurdistan region in particular, both through direct military action and by attacking the neighboring Kurdistan region of Iraq. Continue reading

COMMENT: Why replenished ties between Uzbekistan and Turkey suit both Tashkent and Ankara

New Stage in Turkey-Uzbekistan Strategic Partnership – ERI

For both Uzbekistan and Turkey, progress in developing a strategic relationship with elements of trade, investment, and defence cooperation comes at an opportune time. Amid the ongoing momentous geopolitical developments, Tashkent needs to diversify its political outreach to maintain a multivector foreign policy in order to avoid falling under the sway of a particular regional actor. Ankara, meanwhile, wants relationships that revitalize its pan-Turkic agenda across Eurasia.

On March 29, President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid an official visit to Uzbekistan at the invitation of his counterpart President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. The strategic partnership was top of the agenda. Although relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan remained stalled during the rule of late Uzbek leader Islam Karimov until 2016, his successor Mirziyoyev has very much brought Turkey into the picture under the multivector approach. For Turkey, the development of ties with Uzbekistan somewhat uneasily took some steps forward just as Ankara was attempting to moderate peace talks between Ukraine and Russia. Continue reading