Photo: Opening ceremony of accommodation for the Russian peace-keeping contingent in Karabakh; Russian Ministry of Defence
As part of the 10 November ceasefire agreement that ended last year’s 44-day war, a contingent of Russian soldiers was deployed to Karabakh as peacekeepers. However, the lack of a formally agreed mandate and perceptions of Russian overstepping has led to growing tensions between Baku and Moscow, writes Fuad Shahbazov in this op-ed for KarabakhSpace.eu.
The second Karabakh war ended with the signing of a Russia-brokered ceasefire agreement and the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces with the aim of preventing further hostilities and ensuring stability in the region. However, the ceasefire arrangements between Azerbaijan–Armenia on one side and Russia–Turkey on the other has left more questions than answers. The fact that there is still no formally agreed mandate for the Russian forces operating on the ground causes outrage in Azerbaijan as local authorities loudly criticise Moscow for provocative actions. Continue reading
Trans-Caspian Pipeline (Photo-Credit: IENE)
On November 10, the second war in Nagorno-Karabakh ended with a Russia-brokered ceasefire agreement signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia. While the 44-day war caused severe damages to frontline settlements and civilian casualties on both sides, frequent missile attacks carried out by Armenia towards Azerbaijani cities and infrastructure beyond the frontline raised concerns not only in Baku but also in the EU regarding the security of vitally important energy infrastructure. The possibility of damages to energy infrastructure, particularly the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline, would explicitly put the role of these pipelines in European energy security under question.
BACKGROUND: The Tovuz/Tavush incidents on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan in July 2020 became a prelude to the second war between Baku and Yerevan in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. On September 27, 2020, fighting escalated beyond the established “meeting point” (Line of Contact) with the involvement of a significant number of military personnel, artillery units, and long-range missiles, threatening the geopolitical stability in the Black Sea-Caspian region. Continue reading
President Erdogan’s initiative for a 3 + 3 regional co-operation format in the South Caucasus offers the possibility of opening up the region through an extensive network of land corridors. Not everyone has welcomed the initiative, but the prospect of turning a fragile region into a beacon of stability after a long period of instability and violence is a worthy aspiration, argues Fuad Shahbazov in this op-ed for KarabakhSpace.eu.
The second Karabakh war has shifted the geopolitical and geo-economic realities in the South Caucasus region, particularly heightening the possibility of competition over the region’s transport corridors. The Moscow-brokered ceasefire agreement signed on 10 November brings with it the possibility of opening a number of transit routes, which have been closed for almost 30 years. In the aftermath of the Armenian forces’ devastating defeat in the 44-day war, the idea of regional co-operation becomes increasingly important. Continue reading
Azeri Artillery shelling Armenian positions (Photo: BBC)
Following the deadliest large-scale violence between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh region for nearly three decades, the active phase of the conflict ended in November with a signed ceasefire agreement. But while the conflict asserted Turkey’s influence in the South Caucasus region, it also contributed to increased tensions between Ankara, Moscow, and Tehran.
The Turkish-Russian confrontation in the South Caucasus can be seen as a logical continuation of the rivalry in Syria and Libya, which resulted in shifting the regional balance of power along the southern borders of Russia. The active political involvement of Ankara in the conflict caused deep outrage not only in Moscow but also in Tehran, another important regional actor.
When fighting began, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Turkey would continue to support Azerbaijan “with all its resources and heart.” During the war, Ankara provided Baku with active political and military support by exporting at least six armed Bayraktar TB2 type attack drones and supplying smart munitions (MAM-L), including precision-guided missiles. Continue reading
Turkish soldier greets an Azerbaijani colleague during recent military exercises between the two countries (photo TRT Istanbul)
The bloody six-week conflict erupted between Azerbaijan and Armenia on September 27 in the Nagorno-Karabakh region resulted in significant territorial gains for Azerbaijani forces. It was no secret that since the early 2000s Azerbaijan had been steadily building up its armed forces. The defeat of the self-proclaimed republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, an unrecognized Armenian populated territory within Azerbaijan’s borders, revealed serious military-technical problems on the Armenian side, which triggered mass anti-government riots in Armenia itself. The recent Russia-brokered ceasefire agreement between Baku and Yerevan halted the ongoing bloodshed and enabled the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in the conflict zone. It also marked a significant shift in regional geopolitics. Continue reading
A serviceman of the Azerbaijani army holds the national Azerbaijani flag during its reconstruction at the dominant height near the village of Talysh, Azerbaijan.
La situation se dégrade pour les troupes arméniennes, qui ont été contraintes de céder du terrain dans le Haut-Karabakh après avoir subi d’importantes pertes. Après deux premières semaines de conflit sans gains territoriaux notables, les forces azerbaïdjanaises ont réalisé depuis la mi-octobre des avancées nettes sur le front sud de cette région séparatiste de l’Azerbaïdjan peuplée en majorité d’Arméniens.
Bakou a repris le contrôle d’une zone frontière de l’Iran, tenue jusqu’alors par l’Arménie. L’armée azerbaïdjanaise est également parvenue à progresser en direction du corridor de Latchin, voie d’accès principale entre le Haut-Karabakh et son allié arménien dans cette région montagneuse. « L’une des priorités de l’armée azerbaïdjanaise est de prendre le contrôle de cette route afin d’interrompre l’arrivée de soutien militaire arménien », explique Fuad Shahbazov, un analyste azerbaïdjanais, qui n’hésite pas à prédire une « défaite inévitable » des troupes du Haut-Karabakh si cette route devait tomber. Continue reading
This image is taken from a video released by the Armenian Defense Ministry on Thursday, Oct. 1, 2020, allegedly shows the shooting down of an Azerbaijani unmanned aerial vehicle
Depuis bientôt trois semaines, le vrombissement menaçant des drones militaires accompagne le quotidien des habitants du Haut-Karabakh. « On a appris à les reconnaître à l’oreille », confie par téléphone Anush Ghavalyan, une analyste politique résidant à Stepanakert, la capitale de ce territoire peuplé d’Arménien, que revendique l’Azerbaïdjan. « Les Azerbaïdjanais s’en étaient déjà servi en 2016, mais là c’est du jamais vu. »
L’Azerbaïdjan fait un emploi immodéré des drones dans le conflit qui l’oppose depuis le 27 septembre aux forces séparatistes du Haut-Karabakh soutenues par l’Arménie. Servant à espionner les positions ennemies, guider les frappes d’artillerie, ou détruire des cibles au sol, ces aéronefs sans pilote ont permis à une armée azerbaïdjanaise mieux équipée de conforter sa supériorité. Le président du Haut-Karabakh, Araïk Haroutiounian a reconnu mercredi 14 octobre que les troupes séparatistes avaient été contraintes à reculer en plusieurs endroits de la ligne de front. Continue reading