Russia and Iran have long been bound together by unrelenting hostility to—and from—the United States. But Russia’s open embrace of the Trump administration has led leaders in Tehran to wonder just how durable their relationship with the Kremlin truly is.
On March 12, Iran, China, and Russia launched joint naval drills in the Gulf of Oman, marking their fifth joint exercises in the last few years. The recent war games came amid the ongoing border tensions in the Middle East—with direct clashes between the Israeli Defense Forces and Iranian proxy groups, including continuous attacks from the Yemen-based Houthi rebels in the Red Sea. According to the Russian media, the exercises involved warships and aviation, focusing on the protection of “maritime economic activity.”
Indeed, the Israel–Hamas war and clashes in Lebanon and Syria following the fall of the Assad regime led to the further militarization of the region. Moreover, the re-election of Donald Trump as the U.S. president led Tehran to seek deeper ties with China and Russia in nearly all fields, including strengthening navy capabilities to deter potential attacks—even as Trump’s most hawkish advisors are conspicuously absent from his administration this time, and those who remain have made statements welcoming a renewed nuclear deal. Nevertheless, Tehran seems cautious as it likely seeks to capitalize on the offer of a new nuclear deal amid the changing geopolitical landscape.
Iran’s Diplomatic Strategy
In the last ten years, Iran has been leaning on the diplomatic and economic support of Russia and China against the West, particularly in terms of national nuclear strategy. The partnership between Moscow and Tehran in particular has evolved significantly since the onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The large-scale war in Ukraine and the effect of Western sanctions on Russia and Iran have each served as a major impetus for the improvement of the bilateral relationship. As such, both sides cemented a bilateral partnership with a new wide-ranging treaty on January 17 in Moscow. A similar agreement was signed with China in 2021, confirming commitment to a bilateral strategic partnership.
However, after January 2025, the Trump administration announced a significant shift in America’s foreign policy discourse—such as putting pressure on Ukraine regarding the peace deal, increasing bellicose rhetoric against China, encouraging diplomatic rapprochement with Russia, and taking the Israeli side against the Iranian proxy network. Among all, Iran is indeed concerned about Moscow’s steadily changing narrative toward Washington amid its shrinking influence in the Middle East and mounting domestic tensions and instability. Notably, the most recent meeting between senior U.S. and Russian officials in Riyadh—in which the atmosphere was positive between the two sides and led to cordial statements—intensified concerns in Tehran. Although Russia and Iran have long been distrustful of each other, Moscow has remained Tehran’s main economic partner and supplier of some critically essential goods, including defense products.
No Longer the Enemy of My Enemy?
Policymakers in Tehran fear that if Russia improves its relationship with the United States, it might consequently downgrade its strategic partnership with Iran—thus enabling the United States and Israel to ratchet up pressure on Tehran by conducting deadly operations against proxies in close vicinity. Undoubtedly, such a scenario will result in the disruption of Russian arms supply to Iran, which at this stage is vitally important for Iran and its proxies to deter Israel and its allies across the Middle East. Since 2019, Russia has become the sole exporter of arms to Iran, as the latter desperately sought Su-35 fighter aircraft and S-400 air defense missile systems to address the country’s dire need for significant air defense systems.
Israel’s accurate air strikes on Iranian military facilities in 2023 and 2024 underscored this need. The strikes—which were essentially uncontested—forced Iran to ramp up cooperation with Russia in this direction, resulting in Moscow’s dispatch of missile experts to Iran several times in 2024 and early 2025. In addition to military/defense partnership, Russia is a crucial country for Iran in terms of circumventing financial sanctions, namely by offering alternative payment systems outside SWIFT, from which both countries are cut off. Moreover, in an attempt to avoid international financial surveillance and banking restrictions, Russia and Iran explored cryptocurrency transactions that were later leveraged by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).
Still, considering the negative impact of the war in Ukraine on Russian diplomacy, domestic stability, economy, and geopolitical influence, it is unlikely that Moscow will abandon its cordial relations with Iran and China for the short-term appreciation of the Trump administration. On the contrary, Russia is still in need of vocal support from Iran and China to amplify its narratives about the war in Ukraine.
But the most recent agreement between Ukraine and Russia—brokered by the United States—for a 30-day partial ceasefire agreement hinted that Moscow is enthusiastic about restoring diplomatic dialogue with Washington. Therefore, if Russia seeks more nuanced concessions from the Trump administration—such as abandoning arms shipments to Ukraine and the possibility of re-deploying Russian troops into Syria—the Kremlin may reward the Trump administration and Israel by pressuring Iran to sign a new nuclear deal and downgrading its comprehensive support to proxy groups in the Middle East. Indeed, such perspectives triggered debates within the Iranian media as to whether Russia would soon align with the United States against Iranian interests and curtail relations with it. In fact, it is likely that the same calculations are ongoing in Moscow—and that Kremlin policymakers would prefer to evaluate the situation and check the pulse of regional allies before making any moves with regard to Iran’s geopolitical and nuclear ambitions.