On August 21, the Iranian parliament confirmed Abbas Aragchi, a well-known veteran diplomat, as foreign minister upon the recommendation of the newly-elected president, Masoud Pezeshkian. A product of the foreign policy establishment, Aragchi started his diplomatic career as a political analyst within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rising through the ranks with a particular distinction. He gained notoriety in the West as one of the top negotiators of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which placed restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program in favor of sanctions relief.
Following domestic unrest in Iran, punctuated by mass riots in 2022, violent terror attacks in major Iranian cities, a shrinking economy, and heavy inflation. When President Ebrahim Raisi died unexpectedly in a helicopter crash in May 2024, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei allowed reformist lawmaker Masoud Pezeshkian, an ethnic Azerbaijani, to run in presidential elections. When Pezeshkian won the July 5 vote, he became the first reformist leader since Hassan Rouhani left office in 2021.
A Different Approach? Not So Fast
Shortly after taking power, Pezehskian expressed his desire to smooth relations with the West. He invited known figures to join the government, such as Javad Zarif, former Foreign Minister Mohammad Eslami, Mohammad Atabak, and Abbas Aragchi, who support a reformist agenda and the improvement of diplomatic ties with the West. Though Araghchi, like all of President Masoud Pezeshkian’s cabinet nominees, “reaffirmed his unwavering loyalty to revolutionary ideals of the Islamic Republic and the Supreme Leader,” it appeared that Pezeshkian’s government would chart a new course.
Indeed, upon being appointed top diplomat, Abbas Aragchi vowed to conduct foreign policy with an eye toward Iran’s core national interests. Although Aragchi’s statements were light on details, the new foreign minister declared that Tehran would maintain its strategic links with Moscow and Beijing and stick to its now-traditional proxy-warfare strategy. In addition, under Aragchi’s leadership, Iran may further strengthen ties with developing states in Latin American and African states to form new political connections and economic partnerships.
Indeed, it is still unclear if Abbas Aragchi will be capable of bringing about a true diplomatic thaw with the European Union (EU) in light of harsh criticism from European capitals. The EU remains wary of Iran’s nuclear activity, its support for Hamas, and its material support to Russia’s war machine in Ukraine. Undoubtedly, rapprochement with the West is the most complex task for Pezeshkian’s government. The two sides find themselves backing opposing forces in Gaza and Lebanon, as well as in Yemen. And those are conflicts just within the Middle East.
Closer to Home
Iran’s new foreign minister must also contend with a critical situation closer to home. Aragchi will need to ensure smooth diplomacy with Turkey and Azerbaijan, whose alliance in the South Caucasus has rung alarm bells in Tehran. In 2020, Azerbaijan’s overwhelming military victory over Armenia paved the way for Baku to foster relations with Turkey and Israel, much to Iran’s anxiety. As such, the relations between Baku and Tehran dramatically worsened between 2020-2023, leaving Iran vulnerable in its own backyard. President Pezeshkian has dropped the aggressive rhetoric toward Azerbaijan in an attempt to restore diplomatic relations and enhance Iran’s position in the Caucasus.
However, these conciliatory efforts may earn Abbas Aragchi the ire of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the hardline backbone of the Islamic Republic’s national security apparatus. For the IRGC, any positive signal toward the West or other regional states—even if intended to ease the country’s unprecedented burden—will draw skepticism and institutional opposition. Moreover, Aragchi may face fierce pressure from hardline forces within Iran to be more aggressive abroad, particularly after Israel’s most recent operation in Lebanon that killed long-time Iran ally and the leader of Hezbollah, Hasan Nasrallah.
Therefore, despite the new administration’s stated desire to rekindle ties with the West, Abbas Aragchi may struggle to slash the ballistic missile and drone programs that remain the biggest sticking points with the United States and the EU. As a career diplomat and statesman, Aragchi understands that engaging in dialogue with the West over these issues, as well as Iran’s nuclear program, is the key to addressing many of Iran’s socio-economic challenges. Consequently, Aragchi’s approach reflects the government’s ambitious five-year development plan, which targets an 8 percent annual growth rate. Absent major diplomatic breakthroughs that relieve the harsh raft of international sanctions afflicting the Iranian economy, this pace of economic development is little more than a pipe dream.
The ongoing Gaza war and Israel’s ground operation in southern Lebanon will put more pressure on Tehran to act, threatening to destabilize the region even more. Therefore, Iran’s overriding national security imperatives and the institutional power of hardline voices in Tehran might push Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Aragchi to pursue a pragmatic foreign policy closer to Raisi’s than the ambitious agenda they previously envisioned.
This piece was originally published by Gulf International Forum
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.