On Feb. 22, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev visited Moscow at the invitation of Russian President Vladimir Putin at what was a sensitive moment—just a day after Moscow officially recognized the independence of the separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine and a day before Russia launched a full-scale invasion of the country.
The main agenda of Aliyev’s visit was to sign a new declaration that upgraded the two countries’ relationship to one of “allied cooperation.” The declaration expresses both sides’ intention of strengthening cooperation across a wide range of fields, including regional security issues, military ties, energy, and trade, while calling for mutual consultations on joint efforts in international organizations, with the aim “to protect the interests of Azerbaijan and Russia.” It builds on two previous agreements signed between the two countries in 1997 and 2008 that elevated their relationship to a strategic partnership.
Unsurprisingly, the timing of the declaration’s signature was poorly received in Azerbaijan, where many interpreted the document as sacrificing Baku’s long-term strategy of a balanced and independent foreign policy. It also triggered speculation and public debate at home as well as in the Russian media as to whether the move was imposed by Moscow, or whether it represented yet another pragmatic step by Baku to ensure its national interests in a rapidly changing European geopolitical environment.
From Azerbaijan’s perspective, though, the outreach to Russia should come as no surprise. Baku has long pursued a balanced foreign policy between Moscow and the West, maneuvering as best it can to prevent Azerbaijan from falling under the influence of either. Notably, the new declaration came just weeks after the European Union’s energy commissioner visited Baku seeking increased natural gas deliveries to make up for potential shortfalls in the event Russia cuts off supplies as part of the standoff over Ukraine—a request that Baku granted. Nor is this the first such allied cooperation agreement that Moscow has pursued with regional states: In 2000, Russia signed a similar document with Armenia to boost “bilateral cooperation between the two partner states in defense, economic, and social fields.”
However, the new declaration is particularly important for Azerbaijan in light of the ongoing uncertainties around Nagorno-Karabakh and the Russian peacekeeping mission deployed in the breakaway region—which is internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory but is partly controlled by ethnic Armenians—since the cease-fire agreement that ended the most recent fighting there in November 2020. That mission still lacks a clear mandate, and although the new declaration does not directly address the issue, Baku seems to think it could eventually lead to more clarity on Russia’s role in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Though framed as an alliance, the new declaration is written in general language assuring Baku’s friendly attitude toward Russia, but falls short of outlining specific obligations for either party. For Moscow, it was likely meant to ensure that Azerbaijan abstains from Western efforts to isolate Russia, including sanctions imposed by the U.S. and the European Union, following the invasion of Ukraine.
Despite the optics of Aliyev’s visit coming against the backdrop of the invasion of Ukraine, Azerbaijan’s main concern in deepening cooperation with Moscow remains Nagorno-Karabakh.
Besides these more general points, there are also a few new articles in the document outlining closer defense and military cooperation. In practical terms, these mean that Baku will probably continue to import Russian arms, participate in joint modernization programs of certain types of Soviet-era weapons—particularly helicopters and aircraft—and cooperate with Moscow on issues related to regional security.
By signing an agreement guaranteeing its “close military partnership,” Baku also sidestepped having to join the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, or CSTO, something that Moscow has sought and Baku has avoided for many years. For Baku, joining the CSTO alongside Armenia has long been unacceptable. But membership would also bring with it some tough obligations as well as negative consequences for its relations with the West.
Upon the signing of the agreement, some critics raised concerns that Baku may also bow to Russian pressure to recognize the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk. But while Baku has so far abstained from public statements of support for Kyiv since Russia began its invasion, Azerbaijan has already made its position regarding Ukraine’s territorial integrity clear: In January, when tensions between Ukraine and Russia had peaked, Aliyev flew to Kyiv, where he and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed agreements for energy cooperation as well as a Joint Declaration reaffirming both sides’ readiness to, according to Zelensky, “provide mutual support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity of [their states] within internationally recognized borders.” Once the Russian invasion began, Azerbaijan quickly responded by dispatching humanitarian aid to Ukraine and agreeing to provide free fuel via its State Oil Company, SOCAR, for Ukrainian ambulances and fire engines.
Nevertheless, despite the optics of Aliyev’s visit coming against the backdrop of the invasion of Ukraine, Azerbaijan’s main concern in deepening dialogue and cooperation with Moscow remains Nagorno-Karabakh and the de facto separatist regime that still controls it on the ground. Baku insisted on including in the declaration additional points that reaffirm its stance on the region and call for unblocking regional transport linkages, such as railway connections and the Nakhchivan land corridor linking Azerbaijan to Turkey. In so doing, Baku made it clear that closer ties with Moscow would not come at the cost of its own national security interests and red lines.
The document could also be a first step toward further dialogue to establish the ground rules for the Russian peacekeeping mission stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh, with just three years left before its withdrawal, as called for in the November 2020 cease-fire agreement. In particular, Azerbaijan has its eyes on post-conflict reconstruction and a definitive political resolution of the conflict with Armenia as soon as possible, which would make the deployment of the Russian peacekeeping forces unnecessary.
The declaration’s calls for heightened defense and security cooperation notwithstanding, in all likelihood Baku will continue to rely on Turkey and Israel rather than on Russia for military support, due to their advanced military technology and the mutual trust that has developed in those bilateral relationships in the past decade through frequent joint military drills and military contracts. Azerbaijan also recently secured a comprehensive regional security partnership with Turkey—whose military support was critical to Baku’s battlefield victory against Armenian forces in the 2020 war—in the form of the Shusha declaration, which was signed in June, 2021 and recently ratified by the parliaments of both sides.
In this light, the recent declaration signed with Russia can be seen more as a guarantee of Azerbaijan’s neutrality when it comes to Moscow’s conflict with the West, rather than its support. In return, it serves as an investment toward securing Russia’s cooperation in efforts to reach a final peace agreement to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It reflects that, for now, Baku will continue seeking a balance between Russia and the West in order to secure its own interests. But that balance could become more difficult to maintain as Moscow becomes increasingly isolated and all regional states, including Azerbaijan, begin to feel the economic and political costs.
Fuad Shahbazov is a policy analyst covering regional security issues in the South Caucasus. He is a former research fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies of Azerbaijan and a former senior analyst at the Center for Strategic Communications, also in Azerbaijan. He has been a visiting scholar at the Daniel Morgan School of National Security in Washington. Currently, he is a master’s degree candidate in Defense and Diplomacy at the University of Durham in the U.K. He can be found on Twitter at @fuadshahbazov.