On August 8, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan gathered in Washington, D.C. to sign a historic U.S.-brokered peace accord in the presence of President Donald Trump. What was not included in the ink of the accord was any reference to the new geopolitical order in the South Caucasus that it cemented by capitalizing on the waning influence of Russia and Iran. One of the key elements of the new deal includes the creation of a highly profitable strategic trade corridor that passes through both countries, making cross-border trade after decades of violent conflict. The route will run through the southern territories of Azerbaijan and Armenia, giving the former a direct land route with Turkey through its Nakhchivan exclave.
The new route—dubbed the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity,” or TRIPP—will include rail lines, communication lines, oil and gas pipelines developed by American companies. The trade aspect of this deal has enabled Washington to come in as a guarantor of the new framework, sidelining traditional actors like Moscow and Tehran and further isolating them on the regional scale.
America Now Has a Strategic Corridor—on Iran’s Border
Unsurprisingly, the new framework and the land route agreement between Baku and Yerevan, with the direct support and engagement of Washington and U.S. companies, have boosted fears in Tehran—and resulted in threatening statements from Iran’s leadership. The top adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Ali Akbar Velayati, vowed that Iran would turn the area into “a graveyard of the mercenaries of Donald Trump.” Such blustering statements signal that Tehran will try to block the dividends of a U.S.-backed peace plan on its doorstep.
Since the beginning of debates over the Zangezur Corridor project, Iran took a firm stance emphasizing that it will not tolerate any third-party presence in Armenia’s Syunik province, thus turning this issue into a geopolitical bargaining chip. From the Iranian perspective, the border area with Armenia, namely the Meghri route, represents a vital national security area—and America’s presence there may have a military dimension that could threaten the grip of the regime. Accordingly, the potential appearance of American-backed security contractors to keep the peace in the TRIPP will increase Tehran’s fear of encirclement by its geopolitical foes.
Iran’s paranoia comes in light of the recent 12-day war with Israel and the United States, which left the Islamic Republic severely wounded—with significant damage both to its nuclear program and its military elite. Indeed, Iran uses the “foreign military” argument as a justification for its firm stance against any regional format that includes external actors. Iran’s strict opposition to the route project stems partly from geostrategic imbalance in the South Caucasus under the new regional order, as the current diplomatic thaw between Armenia and Turkey—and ongoing deep strategic ties between Azerbaijan and Israel—leave no space for Tehran’s maneuvering. From an economic perspective, the functioning of the new route under U.S. control will put an end to Iran’s long-term ambitions as a transit route between Armenia-Russia and Azerbaijan-Turkey.
Tehran’s Shrinking Options
In the weeks ahead, Iran will likely attempt to persuade Russia to oppose the new route project. However, given Russia’s waning influence, recent diplomatic rifts between Baku and Moscow, and the new round of negotiations of the ongoing war in Ukraine, Moscow seems to lack powerful pressure tools to stand by Tehran. Without Russian support, Iran has few cards to play, given how exposed it has become in the weeks since the June 2025 war.
Notably, the hostile attitude towards Armenia-Azerbaijan reconciliation generally—and the TRIPP in particular—is not universal in Tehran. Iran’s ‘reformist’ wing, led by President Masoud Pezeshkian, has taken a more pragmatic approach to the corridor project, insinuating that the TRIPP does not represent any significant challenges to Iran’s regional interests. Predictably, though, the president’s remarks have faced harsh criticism from conservatives led by MP Alaeddin Boroujerdi and Ali Akbar Velayati. Overall, the attitude among Iran’s elite is gloomy—notably darkening the normally cordial relations between Tehran and Yerevan. In anticipation of diplomatic tensions, Armenia dispatched Vice President of the National Assembly Ruben Rubinyan on a diplomatic mission to Iran, seeking to peacefully resolve any disputes with Tehran—while preserving this once-in-a-generation opportunity for peace with Azerbaijan. The long-term outcome of these discussions, and whether or not the two sides can keep good relations amid the major regional realignment, is still unclear.