Deepening tensions and turbulence have gripped the Middle East, caused by the War on Gaza and the emergent Iran-Israel confrontation. The security situation in the region has deteriorated, enabling other regional state and non-state actors to join the conflict. One of these prominent actors is the Yemen-based Houthi rebels, which have disrupted trade transiting the Red Sea by launching attacks on commercial vessels. Though the Houthis predicate their attacks on merchant vessels as targeting ships headed to Israel, their strikes have been more haphazard than the group’s rhetoric suggests.
Category: MENA in Turbulence
Iraqi mass media confirmed recently that the Biden administration had delivered heavy artillery to the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) despite objections from Iraqi authorities in Baghdad.
The U.S. called the delivery of two dozen 105 mm M119 howitzers to the KRG a “long-planned transfer” meant to build capacity for Kurdish Peshmerga forces. But in Baghdad, there were calls from some to seize the artillery and concern that the new U.S. support could exacerbate already tense relations between Baghdad and Erbil, threatening efforts by Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani to improve ties with the KRG and preserve good relations with Washington despite the anticipated withdrawal of U.S. troops from central Iraq next year.
On August 21, the Iranian parliament confirmed Abbas Aragchi, a well-known veteran diplomat, as foreign minister upon the recommendation of the newly-elected president, Masoud Pezeshkian. A product of the foreign policy establishment, Aragchi started his diplomatic career as a political analyst within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rising through the ranks with a particular distinction. He gained notoriety in the West as one of the top negotiators of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which placed restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program in favor of sanctions relief.
Following domestic unrest in Iran, punctuated by mass riots in 2022, violent terror attacks in major Iranian cities, a shrinking economy, and heavy inflation. When President Ebrahim Raisi died unexpectedly in a helicopter crash in May 2024, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei allowed reformist lawmaker Masoud Pezeshkian, an ethnic Azerbaijani, to run in presidential elections. When Pezeshkian won the July 5 vote, he became the first reformist leader since Hassan Rouhani left office in 2021.
Israeli President Isaac Herzog concluded his historic first visit to Albania in September, shortly after his first-ever trip to Serbia, where both sides agreed to deepen bilateral cooperation amid Israel’s extending military campaign against Hamas and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Although the recent intensive diplomatic dialogue between Israel and Balkan states is gaining more impetus, it is not a new phenomenon. In the last five years, much has been done to ensure Israel’s expanding diplomatic, security, and economic ties with the Balkans, particularly with Albania and Serbia.
In light of the worsening geopolitical tensions in the Middle East after the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023 and Israel’s large-scale military campaign in Gaza and southern Lebanon, Tel Aviv sought to build new alliances and partnerships at a critical time. Hence, Israel’s kinship in building security ties with Serbia is essential, given its well-established defense industry in the Balkan region.
Azerbaijan has built strong partnerships with Israel in energy and defense for the last two decades despite also maintaining ties with Turkey and Iran
The impact of the geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East stemming from the ongoing Israel–Hamas war extends far beyond the region.
Since Hamas’s brutal October 7 terror attack on southern Israel, Israeli forces have conducted large-scale military operations in Gaza to try to destroy Hamas and armed radicals affiliated with the militant Palestinian group. Although many countries in Europe and Asia voiced support for Israel at least initially, others have tried to remain neutral, while countries such as Iran, Russia, Turkey, Ireland, and Spain have blamed Israel for the excessive use of force in Gaza and disregard of civilian lives.
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 100
Executive Summary:
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In June, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss, among other issues, Türkiye’s prospective membership in the loose-economic grouping of BRICS, which Putin “fully supports.”
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The impetus for BRICS expansion has grown significantly amid Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with Moscow and Beijing promoting it as a critical counterweight to US and Western influence.
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Türkiye’s pursuit of BRICS membership looks to promote foreign investment, increased market access, and economic growth and reflects a foreign policy tradition of balancing between regional powers.
On June 11, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan attended a session of the BRICS group (a loose political-economic grouping originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in Moscow. While there, he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu (Turkish Foreign Ministry, June 11). During the face-to-face meeting with Putin, Fidan discussed bilateral economic and political relations, focusing on the geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East caused by the war in Gaza (Al-Monitor, June 16). Putin vowed to “fully support” Turkish membership in BRICS and build stronger ties to facilitate further economic cooperation.
On June 18, Saudi Arabia’s Defense Minister, Prince Khalid bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, paid an official visit to China to meet his Chinese counterpart, Admiral Dong Jun, and discuss ways to boost the military partnership between the two states. The Saudi defense minister’s first visit to Beijing should come as a little surprise as China’s arms exports to Riyadh have increased significantly in recent years.
Although the United States has traditionally occupied the role of Saudi Arabia’s main security partner and predominant arms supplier, between 2016 and 2020, China increased its arms transfers to Saudi Arabia by nearly 400 percent compared to the previous five-year period. In 2017, Saudi Arabia acquired several Chinese Wing Loong II drones and entered into a memorandum of understanding with China to manufacture an additional 300 drones domestically. The export of Chinese-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has become a political football between Riyadh and Washington, which refused to sell indigenously manufactured UAVs to the Gulf states—prompting a frustrated Saudi Arabia to look eastward.
As the world’s leading energy exporter, Saudi Arabia’s decision to raise the price of oil for its Asian customers, namely China and India, is a significant development. The surprise move, announced ahead of the much-anticipated OPEC+ meeting on June 2, saw Saudi Aramco increase the price of Arab Light crude for Asia customers by over 300 percent—from $0.90 to $2.90 per barrel above the Oman-Dubai benchmark. Saudi officials cited strengthening oil benchmarks, particularly the price of Dubai-Oman crude, to justify the price hike. However, a more likely underlying motive would be Saudi Arabia’s desire to maintain high oil prices in the face of the ongoing war on Gaza and the potential for further destabilization across the Middle East, which pose a serious threat to global oil markets and the country’s economy—although the attempt to secure its own economic well-being will certainly buy it no friends to the east.
Is ISIS Reviving in Iraq?
On May 13, Iraqi media reported a brutal attack by the notorious Islamic State (ISIS) on a military outpost in eastern Diyala and Salahuddin provinces.
Iraqi authorities did not provide specific details of the deadly incident apart from saying that the attackers killed a commanding officer and four Iraqi soldiers and wounded others. Iraqi forces launched an operation in the al-Aith area of Salahuddin in retaliation.
That the May 13 attack was perpetrated by Islamic State militants suggests that rural areas remain a hotbed of activity for militant cells despite an earlier declaration of victory over ISIS in Iraq and Syria by a U.S.-led international anti-terrorist coalition in 2017. Other regional threats, including sectarian and proxy wars, appear to have undermined the Iraqi government’s counter-ISIS efforts and facilitated the radical organization’s revival.
Since it first emerged as an economic powerhouse in the 1990s and early 2000s, China has consistently adhered to the principle of neutrality and non-interference in other nations’ internal affairs. As it gained economic clout and a growing market share throughout the Middle East, Beijing preserved its reputation as a neutral market, conducting trade with all nations and remaining aloof from regional politics. Given this background, the announcement in March of a China-mediated diplomatic normalization between Saudi Arabia and Iran—the Gulf’s two primary geopolitical foes—after years of the rivalry came as a shock both to Middle Eastern and Western experts. The Saudi-Iran détente could contribute to the de-escalation of deadly tensions, particularly in the Gulf region. Riyadh and Tehran are engaged in prolonged and bloody proxy wars in the Middle East—most notably in Yemen, where Saudi Arabia has led a military coalition against the country’s northern Houthi rebels for eight years without success.