In mid-August, Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, visited both Lebanon and Iraq as part of Tehran’s attempt to bolster its diminished influence in the Middle East following the 12-day war with Israel in June.
The trip was also viewed as an effort to project power and revive Tehran’s regional network of proxy militias, including Hezbollah, which Israeli military operations have severely weakened over the past two years. Larijani, who is one of the most trusted political figures of the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, visited Beirut on 13 August, at a time when the Lebanese state is moving ahead with plans to disarm Hezbollah by the end of the year and implement a ceasefire with Israel.
Although Hezbollah sustained colossal losses within its top leadership during Israel’s war, the Iranian-backed group is reluctant to lay down its arms and become a part of the transition. Last week, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said that “we support any decision the group makes, but we do not intervene”.
But the grave implications of continued Israeli airstrikes on pro-Iranian targets in Lebanon have led to social outrage, with many, including Lebanese politicians, accusing Tehran of interfering in Lebanon’s domestic issues. While Iran has denied allegations of interference, recent trips by Iranian top officials, such as the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards – Quds Force (IRGC-QF) Esmael Qaani’s visit to Iraq, suggest that Iran is preparing for another round of large-scale confrontations on its soil, and beyond.
Qaani, while meeting with Iran-backed factions in early July, reportedly warned of “imminent” Israeli attacks and urged unity in a bid to contain internal splits.
Iran’s concerns stem from its fears that new large-scale operations against Tehran and its proxies are inevitable. Both Qaani and Larijani’s trips to the region were aimed at strengthening the uneasy positions of these groups.
In Iraq, this included efforts by Larijani to rally support for a law that codifies the position of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq, an ongoing subject of controversy in the country amid US pressure. By reviving proxies in its close vicinity, Iran is attempting to shore up its strategy of deterrence. During the 12-day war with Israel, the Iraqi government largely prevented these militias from crossing the border with Iran or perpetrating attacks against US military bases on its soil.
“Tehran’s proxies in Iraq remained largely inactive. While they have a history of attacking American assets in the country, these attacks have typically been calibrated to avoid causing serious harm to US forces,” Nikola Mikovic, a Belgrade-based researcher on security affairs, told The New Arab.
During Israel’s war on Iran, statements of condemnation from Iraqi militias, rather than military action, stirred debate about whether Iran’s strategic losses in the region had prompted a growing sense of autonomy among these groups.
However, this appeared to be short-lived, as shortly after the war Iraqi militias were blamed for large-scale drone attacks targeting energy infrastructure in Iraqi Kurdistan, including sites operated by American companies.
While systematic drone attacks in Iraqi Kurdistan and the level of damage indicate the determination of Iran-backed militias to fight external influence in Iraq, it also hints that Iran’s influence over local proxies persists. In this vein, Tehran will likely continue to exert pressure on the Lebanese government regarding the disarmament process of Hezbollah and press for the full integration of Shia militias into Iraqi security forces.
Despite the grave consequences of the war with Israel, Iran appears determined to revive its proxy network. Some analysts, however, question whether this is possible.
“The chances of resuming Iranian influence in territories beyond Iraq in the near term are very slim,” Nikita Smagin, an expert on Iranian affairs, told TNA.
“If Tehran manages to preserve a base of loyal supporters and agents, a partial ‘resurrection’ of its former proxy strategy may be possible after some time,” he added.
Iran’s stance on this issue should not come as a surprise, especially as a new round of confrontation with Israel cannot be ruled out.
Tehran is willing to maintain a certain level of uranium enrichment and is actively trying to compensate for military losses by boosting its partnership with China and Russia, with Israel potentially considering a new series of airstrikes on Iranian military infrastructure, including its militia network in Iraq.
This week, Yahya Rahim Safavi, a senior military adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, said that “We are not in a ceasefire, we are in a stage of war. I think another war may happen,” according to Iranian media.
Despite mounting setbacks, resource shortages, and increasing opposition within its sphere of influence, Iran’s strategy of relying on proxies remains central to its regional security doctrine.
While its immediate prospects for regaining strong influence outside Iraq appear limited, Tehran’s long-term goals suggest that it will continue to invest in proxy structures as tools of deterrence and leverage against Israel and the United States.