The rapid fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024 marked the culmination of dramatic changes to the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Following Assad’s escape to Russia, the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) emerged as the decisive power broker in the new administration—aiming to stabilize Syria’s war-torn society, establish a unity government, and launch mass reconstruction to open a new, post-Assad era in the country’s history. To achieve these lofty goals, the new authorities aimed to build much stronger relations with Turkey—possibly transforming Ankara into its primary security partner—and the wealthy Gulf monarchies. Both the GCC states and Iran largely remained bystanders during HTS’s offensive against Assad—in large part because its lightning speed left little time for international action. After HTS routed Assad’s demoralized forces and seized power, Ankara thus became one of the primary actors in, and beneficiaries of, the new regional order.
In spite of Turkey’s pole position in Syria, the ambitious and energy-rich countries of the Gulf are also extremely important to the transitional Syrian government, given President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s attempts to gain international recognition and rebuild the ruined country. Indeed, al-Sharaa paid his first official foreign visit to Saudi Arabia in February 2025, followed by trips to the UAE, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain. While al-Sharaa’s Gulf tour highlighted Damascus’s new priorities, it also shed light on the critical role that Riyadh and the other Gulf monarchies will play in shaping Syria’s future.
Buying Influence
The Gulf Arab states have their own interests in helping to finance Syria’s reconstruction. Concerned with achieving development and prosperity through national economic diversification programs, the major Gulf monarchies seek to foster greater long-term stability in the Middle East however they can. In this case, the rapid, peaceful post-war reconstruction of Syria would set a positive precedent in the region for other ongoing conflicts. It would also demonstrate these countries’ commitment to peace through development and cement them as major regional power players. Fearful of further fragmentation and unrest—particularly in light of the Gaza war, Lebanon war and the recent Israel-Iran confrontation—ensuring Syria’s continued stability is a high priority for the Gulf states.
Whereas security concerns will dictate Turkey’s footprint and influence in post-Assad Syria, the Gulf’s role will be determined by the fragile political transition taking place in Damascus, as well as their ability to bankroll the country’s development. Syria desperately needs economic aid to rebuild its economic infrastructure, bolster its eroded state institutions, attract foreign investment, and ensure social welfare. Thus far, the Gulf monarchies have appeared more than willing to oblige the new Syrian leadership. During a flurry of diplomatic trips in April 2025, Saudi Arabia and Qatarannounced that they would settle Syria’s debt to the World Bank, totaling roughly $15 million. In a parallel move, Qatar pledged to fund Syria’s public sector and double its electricity supply to alleviate the country’s severe post-war power shortages—offering a critical financial lifeline to the new Syrian government. In the post-Assad era, Saudi Arabia also undertook intensive diplomatic efforts to lift economic and financial sanctions on Syria, engaging American and European officials.
The Gulf monarchies’ deepening engagement with Damascus will enable Riyadh, Doha, and Abu Dhabi to influence Damascus geopolitically. By expanding their economic and diplomatic footprint, the Gulf states aim to limit the resurgence of rival regional actors. Iran’s influence in Syria and across the region—already weakened by domestic instability and strategic setbacks—further eroded following its 12-day war with Israel. This decline opens new strategic space for the Gulf monarchies to shape outcomes in Syria and assert their presence in the broader Levant. In addition, the flow of Saudi and Qatari investments into Syria will significantly reduce Iran’s influence in the country, which prevented the Gulf states from making significant inroads for four decades.
The Gulf States Are Not Monolithic
However, HTS’s entrenched Islamist agenda may pose a challenge for some Gulf monarchies—particularly the UAE, which has consistently opposed pan-Islamist movements and the Muslim Brotherhood, while promoting a foreign policy centered on inclusivity and state-centric stability. In this regard, the interim Syrian government’s embrace of Islamism will inevitably become a sticking point in the Damascus-Abu Dhabi partnership. The UAE will likely pressure the al-Sharaa administration to distance itself from Islamist factions and external powers that would challenge Emirati interests.
For its part, Qatar—which showed ability to work with pan-Islamist groups in its mediation-centered foreign policy and regional policy—mostly intends to finance Syria’s public sector and rebuild its energy infrastructure while mediating between the new Syrian government and Israel. Indeed, Qatar’s approach to the Syrian case enables it to support similar U.S. interests while maintaining Doha’s regional influence.
Though the character and disposition of the new Syrian government remains uncertain, nearly all Gulf monarchies havewelcomed the waning influence of Iran and its proxies in Syria, and the further weakening of the so-called “Axis of Resistance.” The common priority of the Gulf states is to prevent a power vacuum from developing in Syria, given the potential for violent extremist groups such as the Islamic State to exploit such chaos. Therefore, the Gulf remains committed to facilitating Syria’s reconstruction, ensuring the lifting all American and European sanctions, and restoring a modern and technocratic government, and—most importantly—peace in Syria.