A late January visit by Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar to Baku, where he met with President Ilham Aliyev and Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov, was framed by Azerbaijani state media as a significant event reflecting Azerbaijan’s growing authority within regional and global security frameworks.
Israel and Azerbaijan have a long-standing strategic partnership, and the inclusion of a large business delegation underscored Israel’s intent to expand economic cooperation with Azerbaijan, likely through joint projects in energy and infrastructure, especially in the formerly war-torn Karabakh region.
With the Gaza War ongoing despite an ostensible ceasefire and Israel facing mounting international pressure over the plight of the Palestinians, Israel has sought to reinforce ties with partner countries beyond its immediate region, including Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, as part of its peripheral diplomacy.
In parallel, Israel has explored the possibility of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan joining the Abraham Accords, thereby setting a precedent for other non-regional Muslim-majority states to enter the framework. Israel’s push for Azerbaijan’s involvement in the Accords is a part of a calculated effort to extend its security and diplomatic reach beyond the Middle East.
Originally negotiated by the first Trump administration to include the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, the Abraham Accords initiative aims to provide a platform for Azerbaijan’s closer involvement in Gaza’s post-war rehabilitation while bolstering Israel’s image among Muslim states. Strategically, this would underscore Israel’s reliance on Azerbaijan not only as an economic partner but also as a critical node in its broader regional security architecture, particularly in counterbalancing Iran and projecting influence into the South Caucasus.
Yet Baku has made clear that it will not commit troops to a peacekeeping mission in Gaza until Hamas is fully disarmed and neutralized. Azerbaijan is also watching rising unrest in neighboring Iran and the prospect of new Israeli or American strikes on that country with concern.
Saar’s visit to Baku coincided with heightened volatility in Iran amid mass protests against the ruling government and a brutal crackdown that left thousands of civilians and hundreds of law enforcement forces killed. Azerbaijan largely remained silent during the unrest, but Iranian authorities appear to view the crisis not only as the result of domestic problems, but also as a consequence of geopolitical shifts in the region.
In this context, Baku quietly aligned its position with that of its ally Turkey, which openly opposed any attempt at regime change in Iran through external military intervention. Ankara has argued that such an approach could destabilize Iran and risk turning it into another “failed state” in the neighborhood. Azerbaijan’s muted response reflects both its cautious balancing act in regional politics and its reluctance to jeopardize relations with Tehran, while simultaneously signaling deference to Turkey’s strategic outlook.
For Azerbaijan, the most troubling aspect of the recent protests in Iran was the risk of mass repression against the ethnic Azerbaijani minority – Iran’s second largest ethnic group, which is concentrated in the country’s northwestern provinces – as well as the risk that resulting instability could spill across the border and lead to mass refugee outflows.
In this vein, at the Davos Forum on January 21, President Ilham Aliyev stated in response to a question that “Azerbaijan is concerned” with the instability in Iran. Aliyev’s aide Hikmat Hajiyev said in a recent interview that “unpredictability over whether the U.S. will strike Iran is raising concerns for Baku.” However, he also noted that “Baku is not discussing this issue with the Trump administration, maintaining a neutral position.” To underline this stance, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov held a phone conversation with his Iranian counterpart on January 29.
For Azerbaijan, the Iranian vector carries heightened sensitivity due to geographic proximity and infrastructural interdependence. A 765-kilometer shared border forms a dense zone of economic exchange, transportation connectivity, and social interaction.
However, the level of threats surrounding Iran has not subsided. The U.S. decision to conduct multi-day military exercises in the Middle East, led by the USS Abraham Lincoln, has further heightened tensions with Tehran. On February 13, President Trump said the U.S. was sending a second aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, to the region, and while endorsing diplomacy with Iran, added that regime change “would be the best thing that could happen” to the Islamic Republic.
Amid escalating tensions and increasingly bellicose rhetoric, Iranian authorities have intensified their outreach to neighboring states. President Masoud Pezeshkian held a phone conversation on January 31 with Azerbaijani President Aliyev, who voiced concern over the unfolding situation in the region. A week later, Iranian Defense Minister General Aziz Nasirzadeh arrived in Baku for meetings with both Aliyev and Azerbaijan’s Defense Minister. President Aliyev repeatedly reaffirmed his country’s readiness to support efforts aimed at de-escalating the growing confrontation between Iran and the United States and encouraged ongoing talks in Oman.
Iran views the growing outreach of Israel toward the South Caucasus as concerning and fears a deeper trilateral alignment among the United States, Israel, and Azerbaijan. For example, the Trump administration’s repeal of Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act would mark a practical and symbolic step toward strengthening US-Azerbaijani cooperation and addressing the potential challenges posed by Iran’s internal instability. In 1992, in the wake of the first Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the U.S. Senate adopted an amendment, known as Section 907, prohibiting U.S. direct assistance to the government of Azerbaijan. A repeal would open the way for such assistance, including military aid.
The U.S. is also looking forward to a new land transportation route through Armenia, connecting Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave and to Turkey while bypassing Russia and Iran – the so-called Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). Vice President JD Vance visited both Armenia and Azerbaijan last week to advance the project. However, successful implementation requires maintaining stability along the Azerbaijan-Armenia-Iran frontier.