Executive Summary:
- Ankara has signaled from the outset of the Iran conflict that it would consider military intervention in northern Iraq’s Kurdistan region should a Kurdish-led insurgency materialize.
- Türkiye views potential Kurdish militancy in Iran as a direct national security threat, strongly opposes any armed Kurdish role, and has signaled it could consider intervention to prevent Kurdish cross-border insurgency and regional destabilization.
- Azerbaijan fears Kurdish involvement in the Iran conflict could destabilize Iran’s northwest, inflaming ethnic tensions and endangering Azerbaijani minorities in the region along with regional connectivity drives. Ankara and Baku coordinate diplomatically and militarily to contain spillover risks.
Washington and Tel Aviv reportedly considered providing political and logistical support for Iranian Kurdish militant groups along the Iran–Iraq border in the first week or two of their conflict with Iran (Future War Magazine, March 26; The Times of Israel, March 29). The plan was abandoned in late March because of regional diplomatic pressure, Tehran’s military strikes on Kurdish regions of Iran and Iraq, Iran’s intelligence crackdown, inconsistent support from the United States and Israel, and media leaks. The potential involvement of Kurdish militias in the Iran conflict could draw more regional states into the conflict, particularly Türkiye, which has expressed clear opposition to any armed Kurdish role in Iran (Amwaj, March 25).
From the outset of the Iran conflict, Türkiye has signaled that it would consider military intervention in northern Iraq’s Kurdistan region should Kurdish-led insurgency materialize (Asharq Al-Awsat, March 30). Ankara has consistently underscored the issue of armed Kurdish participation as a red line and held high-level talks with top officials in Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government to urge them not to get involved in Iran (Daily Sabah, March 29). Even though Türkiye and Iran have a long history of tension, their bilateral relations have remained functional based on shared economic interests and a desire to keep their Kurdish minorities pacified.
Türkiye’s decades-long clashes with the Kurdish militia in Southeastern Anatolia, northern Syria, and Iraq formally ended in May 2025 with the beginning of the process of the dismantling of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) (Al Jazeera, June 18, 2025). Türkiye’s opposition to armed Kurdish movements throughout the region remains, and the two-week U.S.–Israeli–Iran ceasefire is scheduled to expire on April 22.
On February 22, five major Iranian Kurdish parties formed the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (CPFIK), mostly based in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (KRG) (Jinsa, February 27). Shortly after news reports regarding possible Kurdish involvement in Iran emerged, Tehran conducted a series of missile attacks on Sulaimaniyah city in Iraq’s Kurdistan region in early March, widely interpreted as a preemptive effort to deter them from entering the conflict (Iran International, March 15).
Azerbaijanis have also expressed concern at the prospect of Kurdish involvement in the Iran conflict because of Azerbaijan’s Kurdish minority population and the large number of ethnic Azerbaijanis inside Iran. Kurdish involvement in the conflict could heighten interethnic tensions within Iran, including for ethnic Azerbaijanis, who constitute at least 16 percent of Iran’s population (France24, March 6). Shiite Azerbaijanis and Sunni Kurds are the largest groups in Iran’s West Azerbaijan province. Azerbaijanis, however, have fared better under the Shiite regime established after the Islamic revolution, and are more integrated into the majority-Persian society (France24, March 6).
The ethnic Azerbaijani and ethnic Kurdish communities clashed with each other in April 1979 in some of the most intense interethnic violence in Iran since the revolution, with total casualties, including those involving Iranian forces, across Iran’s West Azerbaijan Province reaching approximately 1,000 (Geopolitical Monitor; March 23). Ethnic Azerbaijanis have also faced crackdowns from Tehran, and in 2006, dozens of Azerbaijanis were killed and hundreds, if not thousands, arrested following language rights campaigns. If Kurdish groups claim Iran’s Western Azerbaijan province, along the Turkish border, Iran’s ethnic Azerbaijani minority could be geographically severed from Türkiye and Azerbaijan.
Militarized Kurdish groups could provoke a reaction from Ankara and Baku as a part of the same threat matrix. From Baku’s perspective, the potential advance of Kurdish military groups into Iran’s Western Azerbaijan province could disrupt the relative stability of the area, sever connections with the ethnic Azerbaijani minority there, and heighten security risks. Kurdish involvement there could jeopardize the implementation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which is planned to link Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave, and by extension its border with Türkiye, through Armenia’s Syunik province, which is adjacent to the same parts of Iran that Kurdish parties are asserting administrative claims (Daily Sabah, August 15, 2025).
Official Baku will likely have a direct interest in determining who governs Iran’s West Azerbaijan Province in any post-Islamic Republic transition because of adjacent trade routes and the concentration of ethnic Azerbaijanis. Türkiye’s interest, by contrast, is rooted primarily in its domestic security concerns about the Kurds. The Kurdish question has increasingly become a contest among major global powers, serving as a tool of deterrence against pro-Iranian proxies.
Baku and Ankara remain focused on monitoring the activities of non-state actors in and around Iran, seeking to develop a response to mitigate potential geopolitical repercussions. Türkiye–Azerbaijan joint military drills dubbed “Unbreakable Brotherhood — 2026” in Türkiye’s Kars province, which were held on March 26–April 1, should come as a little surprise (Report.az, April 3; Ordu.az, April 4). Baku and Ankara are seemingly attempting to develop a rapid, joint response to any potential escalation in the region, including the involvement of non-state actors.