As tensions deepen between the United States-Israel alliance and Iran and the odds of a military strike against Tehran increase, both nations appear intent on expanding their relations with Azerbaijan—adding a key force multiplier to the conflict.
The rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape in the Middle East has recently been endangered by the United States-led airstrikes targeting Yemen’s Houthi rebels as a part of Trump’s administration’s broader pressure campaign against Iranian-backed proxy groups across the region. Indeed, Iran’s renewed efforts to boost its proxy network amid Israel’s war in Gaza caused a security vacuum, resulting in tectonic changes in the region. As such, deadly attacks against the Houthis in Yemen are a largely reciprocal move due to their frequent missile attacks on Israeli cities, civilian infrastructure, and on merchant ships in the Red Sea.
Since President Donald Trump’s inauguration in January 2025, many have argued that the United States will take a tougher stance on Iran in an effort to contain Tehran’s regional influence, diminish its leverage over numerous proxy groups—particularly Hamas and Lebanon-based Hezbollah—and ink a new nuclear agreement. In this vein, Donald Trump’s letter addressed to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on March 12, 2025, which demanded that the two sides return to the negotiations table over the nuclear deal within two months, should come as little surprise. However, Ayatollah Khamenei refused to entertain negotiations with Washington, emphasizing Iran’s capability to retaliate against any threat—and signaling that the confrontation would reach its inflection point in the coming months.
America Considers Bombing Iran—And Tehran Reacts
Khamenei’s seeming intransigence has stoked aggressive rhetoric in the United States and Israel. This, in combination with certain military moves—notably the deployment of large numbers of B-2 bombers to the U.S. military base in Diego Garcia, roughly 3,000 miles south of Iran—has prompted recent speculation of upcoming coordinated U.S.-Israel strikes on Iran as a part of efforts to diminish Tehran’s regional influence, as well as to end its longtime effort to acquire nuclear bombs. Although U.S. and Israeli authorities have not offered any comment regarding such plans toward Iran, the unusual frequency of Ayatollah Khamenei’s statements and public speeches, and open calls for Iranian MPs to “rethink the country’s nuclear and military doctrine,” hint that Tehran is nervously preparing for a major attack on its main military facilities, energy infrastructure, and likely its nuclear sites. In addition, Tehran recently urged its proxies in Iraq to move their headquarters, financial resources, and ammunition stockpiles in Karbala, Anbar, Baghdad, Salahaddin, and other provinces to different parts of the country—strictly during night hours to prevent them from any tracing. On the other hand, Yemen’s Houthis received orders from Tehran to renew missile attacks on Israeli cities and infrastructure.
As heated debates have raged in the West and Israel regarding the necessity of curbing Iranian influence, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has not been idle. On March 6, it showcased and tested new defensive and offensive weapons in large-scale military exercises, including secret underground naval bases along the southern coast—thus referring to the country’s preparedness for another tumultuous year amid threats. Despite the frequent demonstrations of new ballistic missiles, the inauguration of new military bases, and the Iranian authorities’ bellicose rhetoric, Tehran seems to appreciate the limitations of its influence and military capabilities in light of Israel’s extended military operations against its proxies in Gaza, southern Lebanon, and southern Syria.
Iran’s fear partially stems from having no credible regional ally or partner to mediate between itself and the United States. Russia, Iran’s main foreign ally, is as distrusted by Washington as Tehran itself. On the flip side, its neighbor and fellow Shi’a Muslim country Azerbaijan maintains a long-term strategic partnership with Israel, particularly in the military/defense field, despite harsh criticism of Iran’s conservative political establishment. Amid the ongoing Gaza War, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s aide Hikmat Hajiyev landed in Israel in December 2024 to meet Israeli officials—and again in February 2025 to meet Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu while Iran watched from the sidelines. Consequently, Iran’s deteriorating relations with Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan risk igniting the regional security architecture—a predicament made even worse by the specter of significant U.S.-Israel airstrikes.
Critically, Israel is likely not strong enough on its own to do lasting damage to Iran. Although it could delay Iran’s nuclear program through violence, it likely could not stop it altogether—unless it had assistance from Washington. Moreover, in the event of Israeli strikes against Iran, Tehran has promised regional retaliation, even if Israel strikes alone. In this case, deterrence of retaliation of this scale would require advance coordination with Washington, as in the case of Yemeni Houthis. This fact notwithstanding, Israel is simultaneously engaged in building more sophisticated partnerships through muted diplomacy in Iran’s close vicinity ahead of the potential operation against it, namely with Azerbaijan. Undoubtedly, Israel’s intensifying diplomatic traffic with Baku in the aftermath of the October 7 attacks boosted concerns in Tehran, even though Azerbaijani authorities have not taken any public action against it.
A U.S.-Israel-Azerbaijan Alliance Would Be a Game Changer
Azerbaijan’s importance as a key regional small power with its soft power tools, critical energy resources, a strong military, and a long border with Iran are key advantages that Israel has benefited from throughout the two countries’ partnership. In this crucial time full of uncertainty and dangerous regional dynamics, Semion Moshiashvili, a Knesset member from the Shas party, proposed the formation of a strategic alliance between the United States, Israel, and Azerbaijan—a step that was promptly endorsed by Orit Strock, Israel’s Minister of National Missions.
Such an alliance would not be easy to make, given longtime political uncertainty between Washington and Baku. But its formation would allow Israel and the United States to create a security belt stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Caspian Sea, making it easier to counter Iranian influence and Russian regional ambitions as a bonus. America’s interest in the prospective partnership format received an unexpected boost after Steve Witkoff, President Donald Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East, embarked on a short surprise trip to Baku on March 14 on his way back from Moscow. Although the Azerbaijani government would neither confirm nor deny Witkoff’s presence on its soil, it was more than a simple coincidence—hinting that Israel employed all diplomatic channels in Washington to organize Witkoff’s visit to Baku even for a few hours.
Prime Minister Netanyahu is looking for a more profound partnership format that includes Azerbaijan and other potential partners, thus forging an alliance against Iran and simultaneously pressuring the Trump administration to take countermeasures. However, despite assurances from Washington, President Trump recently underlined that he would prefer to make a deal with Tehran, though he would not take military action off the table if such negotiations failed. It is no secret that the Netanyahu cabinet hopes such talks will fail—and it has worked hard to persuade the Trump administration to participate in joint strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities while it is at its most vulnerable.
In this regard, Azerbaijan’s borders with Iran, its access to the Caspian basin, its military-technical and intelligence capabilities, and its information channels have emboldened the United States and Israel to intensify backstage negotiations with Baku. Nevertheless, it is clear that Azerbaijan will not grant authorization to Israel or America to use its territories as a platform to attack Iranian targets. Although Azerbaijan’s distrust toward Iran skyrocketed dramatically in the aftermath of the 2020 diplomatic confrontation and the terror attack on Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran in 2023, the Aliyev administration appears unwilling to directly become involved in a war against its much larger southern neighbor.
This reluctance notwithstanding, there is still a possibility that the United States, Israel, and Azerbaijan will be engaged in information exchange for some time amid the Gaza operation. Further high-level visits to and from all three nations are a virtual certainty. Azerbaijan is clearly in favor of an alliance with Israel, particularly in the security field, and such an alliance with the involvement of the United States could yield both military and political benefits for Baku. In its turn, the Trump administration will undoubtedly put its blessing on a deeper Azerbaijan-Israel partnership against the Iranian factor, as in the case of the recent purchase by Azerbaijani State Oil Company (SOCAR) of a 10% stake in Israel’s Tamar gas field near Haifa.
The possibility of a US-Israeli joint operation against Iran raises the specter of escalation and increased regional instability. Therefore, Israel and America’s efforts to shore up regional strength by courting Azerbaijan is an attempt to minimize the risks of a future conflict spiraling out of control.